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Harav Hagaon Shmuel Wolman Shlita

Past the Comfort Zone

Parashas Pinchas

Harav Hagaon Shmuel Wolman shlita

Parashas Pinchas begins by recapping Pinchas’s act of kana’us, which successfully mitigated the terrible plague raging against Klal Yisrael, and the Torah also emphasizes the eternal s’char that Pinchas received for his kana’us. The Ramban points out that the words לָכֵן אֱמֹר seem to convey that the Torah was especially interested in highlighting to Klal Yisrael the unique s’char that Pinchas merited. The Torah does not usually focus on the s’char that individuals receive for their mitzvos. What was so unique about Pinchas’s s’char that the Torah singles it out for special mention?

The Midrash reveals to us that this s’char of Pinchas differed from every other s’char mitzvah, in the sense that Pinchas’s s’char was rightfully deserved: בדין הוא שיטול שכרו. Usually, the Eibishter doles out s’char mitzvah as a chessed, whereas Pinchas could have claimed his even al pi din. Why was Pinchas more deserving of s’char mitzvah that anyone else? If mitzvos generally are not deserving of credit and recognition, why was Pinchas’s act of kana’us different?

To answer this question, let us first examine the s’char of Pinchas. We know that he was rewarded with kehunah for all generations, as the passuk states: וְהָיְתָה לּוֹ וּלְזַרְעוֹ אַחֲרָיו בְּרִית כְּהֻנַּת עוֹלָם תַּחַת אֲשֶׁר קִנֵּא לֵאלֹקָיו וַיְכַפֵּר עַל בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל. But the passuk begins by saying: הִנְנִי נֹתֵן לוֹ אֶת בְּרִיתִי שָׁלוֹם. Which s’char is that? Some of the meforshei Rashi explain that this s’char of shalom is not an independent reward, but rather a prefatory remark referring to the s’char of kehunah that the passuk is about to mention. Targum Yonasan ben Uziel, however, explains that this is an independent s’char, rendering בְּרִיתִי שָׁלוֹם as: וְאַעְבְּדִינֵיהּ מַלְאָךְ קְיַים וְיֵיחֵי לְעַלְמָא לִמְבַשְׂרָא גְאוּלְתָּא בְּסוֹף יוֹמַיָא. The meforshim explain that this is a reference to Chazal’s teaching that Pinchas is Eliyahu Hanavi, meaning that his s’char is that he will become a malach, which is totally spiritual and therefore lasts for eternity; eventually he will be the one to announce the final geulah.

Similarly, the Sforno interprets בְּרִיתִי שָׁלוֹם as a covenant of peace with the malach hamaves, meaning that Pinchas would not be subject to death. Accordingly, Pinchas merited a spiritual level that raised him above typical mortal existence and catapulted him into a new spiritual sphere of eternal existence. Why did Pinchas merit this special madreigah of invincibility to the malach hamaves? Even Moshe Rabbeinu did not enjoy that s’char!

Clearly, there was something very exceptional about Pinchas’s act of kana’us, which raised him, in this specific situation, above Moshe Rabbeinu’s level and earned him a special brachah that Moshe Rabbeinu was not zocheh to.

Let’s examine the difference between the responses of Moshe Rabbeinu and Pinchas to the incident of Zimri. Rashi tells us that Moshe Rabbeinu also witnessed Zimri’s act, but he forgot the halachah of הבועל ארמית קנאים פוגעים בו. In contrast, about Pinchas the Torah says: וַיַּרְא פִּינְחָס, which Rashi renders as: ראה מעשה ונזכר הלכה. It would seem the entire difference between them was that Pinchas remembered that the halachah that deems kana’us to be the appropriate response, while Moshe Rabbeinu forgot that halachah. Could it be that such a seemingly technical difference in recalling a halachic detail could yield such a huge disparity, with Pinchas attaining eternal chiyus and Moshe Rabbeinu remaining a mortal?

Furthermore, if the whole difference between them involved a technical glitch — that Moshe Rabbeinu forgot the halachah — then why is Pinchas’s recall of the halachah considered so extraordinary that he was entitled to reward al pi din? The idea that בדין הוא שיטול שכרו seems to point to something outstanding about Pinchas’s response. Apparently, there’s more to the story.

 

Weakness Bred Forgetfulness

The Midrash tells us: ולפי שנתעצל משה לא ידע איש את קבורתו, ללמדך שצריך אדם להיות עז כנמר וקל כנשר רץ כצבי וגבור כארי לעשות רצון קונו. The Midrash itself points out that this is an example of Hakadosh Baruch Hu being מדקדק עם צדיקים כחוט השערה, but the Midrash is nevertheless insinuating that Moshe, in some minuscule way, was guilty of some laziness, insofar as he lacked the middah of az kanamer that Pinchas exhibited with his kana’us. This raises the question: Was Moshe Rabbeinu’s response a result of forgetting the halachah, or of atzlus? And was Pinchas’s act of kana’us merely a manifestation of his remembering the halachah and acting accordingly, or was it a courageous act of az kanamer?

If we examine the wording of the Midrash carefully, I believe we can arrive at a much deeper understanding. The Midrash says that Zimri brought Kozbi before Moshe and asked if he was permitted to live with this Midyanis. When Moshe Rabbeinu answered that it was forbidden, Zimri displayed his true intentions by retorting with the ultimate setup: “If a Midyanis is forbidden, how did you marry Tzipporah, who is also a Midyanis?” Thereupon, the Midrash says: מיד נתרשלו ידיו של משה ונתעלמה ממנו הלכה.

The words מיד נתרשלו ידיו של משה might hold the key to unlocking the depth of this Midrash. Perhaps the Midrash is confirming that while Moshe Rabbeinu ultimately forgot the actual halachah, the source of that forgetfulness was a certain weakness, a hisrashlus. We can suggest that the Midrash is alluding that had Moshe Rabbeinu exhibited the middah of az kanamer he would not have forgotten this halachah.

How did this lack of az kanamer create a weakness that affected Moshe Rabbeinu’s clarity in remembering the appropriate halachic response? It seems from the words of the Midrash that Moshe Rabbeinu was very shaken by Zimri’s setup in asking him the halachic status of a Midyanis when Moshe Rabbeinu’s wife, Tzipporah, was a Midyanis as well. The meforshim note that there were many obvious distinctions between Moshe Rabbeinu’s relationship with Tzipporah and Zimri’s relationship with Kozbi, however, and had Moshe Rabbeinu remained  strong and maintained the middah of az kanamer — what the baalei avodah refer to as azus d’kedushah — he would have been able to maintain his clarity and not be affected by the comparison to Tzipporah. And had he done so, he would have been able to apply the halachah of הבועל ארמית קנאים פוגעים בו even while being married to a Midyanis.

The Midrash is telling us that the source of Moshe Rabbeinu’s hisrashlus, which led to his forgetting the halachah, was a lack of this incredible azus d’kedushah — which would have allowed him to carry out הבועל מדינית קנאים פוגעים בו. Accordingly, there’s no contradiction between the beginning of the Midrash, which says that he forgot the halachah, and the end of the Midrash, which says that he lacked the middah of az kanamer. It’s all the same root.

 

Rightful Reward, for the Mesirus Nefesh

With this in mind, we can gain a new depth of understanding regarding the kochos hanefesh that were required in order for Pinchas to see clearly the halachah of קנאים פוגעים בו and be able to carry it out properly. Of course, doing so necessitated the obvious strength of character to kill in cold blood l’sheim Shomayim, but it also required mesirus nefesh, as he was risking getting killed himself. Indeed, the Gemara tells us that Zimri could have killed Pinchas on the grounds that he was a rodef.

In light of this Midrash, however, I think we gain a new appreciation for the azus d’kedushah of Pinchas. The meforshim tell us that one of Pinchas’s grandparents descended from Yisro, similar to Moshe Rabbeinu’s wife Tzipporah. Imagine the azus d’kedushah needed in order for a Midyanite einikel to kill Zimri for living with a Midyanis. Imagine the seeming hypocrisy, and imagine the ridicule he was opening himself up to. This is actually what ended up happening – he was teased, and referred to as Ben Putiel, the einikel of Yisro.

Ultimately, the difference between Pinchas and Moshe Rabbeinu was not which one was able to retain clarity in properly applying the halachah, but rather a much more fundamental disparity in the middah of azus d’kedushah, which allowed Pinchas to remain steadfast and maintain clarity of what halachah mandates, rather than bend due to pressure and fear of mockery.

Now we can appreciate that Pinchas was not rewarded for simply remembering the halachah and carrying it out as would be expected of every erlicheh Yid. Rather, Pinchas was dealt a tremendous nisayon, one that demanded supernatural kochos hanefesh. A person’s natural inclination is to lose clarity when under such pressure not to look like a hypocrite. Pinchas’s mesirus nefesh, fueled by a supernatural azus d’kedushah, enabled him to rise above that tendency, and not to fall prey to the hisrashlus that would have caused him to forget the halachah. On the contrary, he displayed the middah of az kanamer in doing exactly what the halachah required — and that’s what yielded such a unique reward.

We can now go back and explain what the Midrash means when it says בדין הוא שיטול שכרו. The Sfas Emes references another Midrash, and I think his intention might be the following. The  Midrash states: מי הקדימני ואשלם מי קלס לפני עד שלא נתתי לו נשמה מי מלל לשמי עד שלא נתתי לו בן זכר מי עשה לי מעקה עד שלא נתתי לו גג מי עשה לי מזוזה עד שלא נתתי לו בית. In other words, it’s very nice that we do mitzvos for the Eibishter, but the Eibishter’s response is, “What do I really owe for these mitzvos? Every mitzvah that a person does, I was the one Who gave him the resources to fulfill the mitzvah. Now I have to pay him?”

The Midrash is telling us that although every mitzvah requires choosing to do the right thing, it is Hakadosh Baruch Hu who gives the person the wherewithal to accomplish the mitzvah — the physical resources, the financial means, and so on. There’s no real grounds, then, for a person to claim s’char mitzvah for using the resources that Hakadosh Baruch Hu provided, in order to serve him. The whole concept of s’char mitzvah is a function of Hakadosh Baruch Hu’s kindness; he rewards people for their mitzvos even though He provided all the supplies and means for the mitzvah.

All this applies when a person utilizes the regular kochos hanefesh that were Divinely provided for his mitzvah use. But when a person goes above and beyond the standard kochos and negates his natural inclinations, he enters a whole new realm that supersedes the argument מי הקדימני ואשלם. Then, the Eibishter no longer claims that all the person did is utilize the kochos He gave him. Rather, he’s rising above his kochos and transcending human nature — and that is when a person actually deserves s’char.

Pinchas act of kana’us was born of azus d’kedushah that required supernatural kochos and mesirus nefesh, and about such a mitzvah it can be said that בדין הוא שיטול שכרו. Accordingly, we can now understand what was so unique about Pinchas’s act, and why he merited the exceptional s’char of eternal chiyus, becoming the Eliyahu Hanavi who will herald the geulah – because when a person demonstrates mesirus nefesh, he attains a whole different level of nitzchiyus.

The Gemara (Shabbos 130( tells us that any mitzvah that Klal Yisrael performed with mesirus nefesh, they will continue to observe forever. This Gemara is conveying that achievements that are within the confines of Olam Hazeh and the standard kochos of the guf are transient and will eventually expire, like every davar gashmi. But once a person enters the realm of mesirus nefesh, going beyond his mundane, physical kochos and connecting to otherworldly neshama’dike kochos, he accesses nitzchiyus. Pinchas’s act of kana’us and mesirus nefesh not only stopped the mageifah, but produced a s’char of פנחס זה אליהו.

We as a klal are still experiencing a very real mageifah — one that we’re feeling very much now in Eretz Yisrael — and we’re desperate to find ways to elicit rachamei Shomayim so that we can rise above the malach hamaves and continue to serve Hashem with brius haguf vehanefesh. I think this parashah is giving us the key, by telling us not to be satisfied with a Yiddishkeit of doing just what’s expected of us, which prompts the claim of מי הקדימני ואשלם. Rather, let’s look for opportunities to go beyond our natural kochos, push ourselves past our comfort zone, and do things that are hard and require some mesirus nefesh. When we do that, we enter a whole new realm, and that’s when, b’ezras Hashem, we’ll experience בדין הוא שיטול שכרו. Hopefully, we will also be zocheh to the incredible brachah of הִנְנִי נֹתֵן לוֹ אֶת בְּרִיתִי שָׁלוֹם, and merit the speedy arrival of Eliyahu Hanavi and the geulah sheleimah.

Gut Shabbos.

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